TOPSHOT – U.S. President Donald Trump receives applause after signing the First Step Act and the Juvenile Justice Reform Act at the White House in Washington, DC on December 21, 2018. However, he has been frustrated by the lack of progress since signing it. An OIG report criticizes Bureau of Prisons efforts (Photo by Jim WATSON/AFP) (Photo by JIM WATSON/AFP via Getty Images)
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The First Step Act passed in 2018 with rare bipartisan support and a clear promise. Reduce recidivism, expand rehabilitation and reduce the cost of incarceration. Congress backed that promise with billions in funding and an expectation that the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) would deliver measurable results.
A newly released Department of Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) Report. raises serious questions about whether this promise is being kept. The findings point to systemic inefficiencies, questionable spending decisions, and structural barriers that continue to undermine the law’s core goals.
$1.23 billion was spent with no clear results
Between fiscal years 2022 and 2024, Congress provided $1.23 billion specifically to implement the First Step Act. The expectation was to expand evidence-based programming and prepare incarcerated individuals for successful reentry. Instead, the OIG found that large portions of this funding were diverted to areas that did not clearly advance these goals.
One of the most striking findings concerns more than $258 million spent on inmate telephone access. While the law allows telephone access as an incentive to participate in programming, the BOP provided free calls to all inmates regardless of participation. Even more troubling, the agency reimbursed about $106 million above its own estimated costs for these services. In the past, the BOP made inmates pay for their own utilities, which they often do while incarcerated, such as personal hygiene items and many items of food and clothing).
This raises two issues. First, whether spending aligns with congressional intent. Second, if the BOP effectively converted time-bound credits into non-expiring funds by transferring them to internal accounts.
Nearly $120 million was transferred to the Department of Labor for a workforce grant program. The BOP maintained limited oversight of how these funds were used, and by the end of 2025, less than half of the expected funds had actually been spent.
This is not just inefficient spending. It represents a missed opportunity to deliver programming where it was most needed.
No proven cost savings
From the beginning, one of the key selling points of the First Step Act was cost reduction. The theory was simple. If people receive programming that reduces recidivism, fewer return to prison and long-term costs are reduced. However, the data reflected in the OIG report, combined with the BOP’s own annual updates, show no clear evidence that this is the case.
According to the OIG, as of April 2026, $16.8 million of the one-year credit remains unused and will likely be carried over entirely for purposes of the First Step Act. At the same time, spending patterns reveal that significant portions of funding are not directly linked to program delivery. Instead, resources are absorbed by administrative inefficiencies, delayed projects, and spending categories that have little measurable impact on relapse outcomes. In an interview I had with BOP Director William Marshall III earlier this year, he highlighted some of his priorities for addressing the BOP’s misuse of funds under previous leadership. As Marshall told me at the time, “We found more than 60 positions that used funding from the First Step Thing that had nothing to do with the First Step Act.”
Planning exists on paper more than in practice
The BOP has consistently reported progress in expanding the program’s availability. Annual updates highlight new offerings, increased participation and a growing list of approved programs. The OIG report tells a more complicated story.
While the availability of the program has technically increased, access remains limited in practice. Facilities often lack the staff, space, or operational stability to deliver programs consistently. As a result, many incarcerated people are unable to participate even when programs are listed as available.
The implications are significant. According to the OIG, about 24 percent of people released early under the First Step Act provisions between 2022 and 2024 did not complete any programming.
This result directly contradicts the intent of the law. Early release had to be earned through participation in recidivism reduction programs. Instead, individuals can accumulate credits simply by being willing to participate, even when no program slots are available.
Staff shortages are undermining the FSA
As of mid-2024, the Bureau had filled just over half of the positions authorized to support implementation of the First Step Act. Even at the beginning of 2026, a significant number of positions remained vacant.
These deficiencies have ripple effects throughout the system. Teachers are not available to conduct classes. Clinicians cannot offer treatment programs. Existing staff are often reassigned to security roles, referred to as augmentation, further reducing program capacity.
In some cases, facilities have created dedicated program spaces that remain unused because no one is available to teach the courses. The result is a system where funding is in place, programs are approved and infrastructure may even be in place, but delivery fails due to lack of staff.
Business realities limit access to programming
Even when staff are available, operational conditions often prevent consistent program delivery. Lockdowns and modified operations, often caused by staff shortages or security concerns, restrict inmate movement and disrupt programming. When programs are interrupted, they take longer to complete, reducing the number of participants who can complete them.
Physical space is another limitation. Many facilities lack adequate classrooms or training spaces, forcing programs to compete for limited space or operate under suboptimal conditions.
These obstacles are not new. They have been documented in previous surveillance reports. What is new is the amount of funding that has been allocated without being resolved.
Trusted data hides true performance
The BOP cannot consistently track how often programs are offered, who actually participates, or whether program availability matches reported claims. In some cases, people are listed as participating in programs that aren’t even offered at their facilities. This creates a fundamental problem. Without accurate data, it is impossible to measure success, allocate resources effectively, or demonstrate accountability.
It also undermines public reporting. BOP’s published program guides suggest broad availability, but internal data shows that many of these programs are not delivered consistently.
Because this matters
The First Step Act represents one of the most significant criminal justice reforms in decades. Its success or failure will shape future policy decisions about sentencing, rehabilitation and prison funding.
The OIG report does not suggest that the law itself is flawed. Instead, it highlights a gap between policy planning and operational execution. It should also be noted that significant progress has been made since Director Marshall appointed Special Assistant to the Director Rick Stover to address some First Step Act issues to lead a task force. Less than a year into the project, the BOP has made improvements to its calculator that more accurately reflects when an inmate earning First Step Act credits should be released.
Without substantial changes, the danger is clear. The First Step Act becomes another well-intentioned reform that fails to achieve its goals, not because the idea was wrong, but because the implementation failed.
What should change?
The path forward is not complicated, but it does require discipline, which Director Marshall has called a priority.
First, funding must be more directly linked to program implementation. Expenditures that do not clearly support rehabilitation should be re-evaluated.
Second, staff shortages must be addressed as a matter of priority. Without trainers and program staff, no amount of funding will produce results.
Third, transparency must be improved. Accurate data is essential to measure results and maintain public trust.
Finally, incentives must be aligned with results. Early release should be tied to actual program completion, not just willingness to participate.
The OIG report provides a road map for reform. The question is whether policymakers and agency leadership are willing to follow through.
