The Ministry of Homeland Security stamp on the podium
When the news broke this funding for the common vulnerabilities and the CVE database (CVE) would end on April 16, Panic quickly spread through the Infosec community. Miter, the non -profit organization that maintains the CVE program, confirmed that it had secured a STOPGAP contract with the US Department of Security – avoiding immediate shutdown. But terrorism emphasized a deeper issue: the excessive dependence of the security industry on a fragile system.
Security leaders, especially CIO and CISOS, are now facing a familiar topic: they differentiate, create internal tools, work together and spend more. But while most of these suggestions are good theoretical, they collapse functionally.
Alternatives: Easily saying than
Yes, we need to differentiate the central source of vulnerability information. But let’s be clear: Most commercial databases, open source supplies or specialist vendors are still dependent on CVE IDs as a reference point. Without CVE, these systems downgrade accuracy or usability. Even the National Vulnerability Database (NVD), which manages the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), acts as a central database of known vulnerable points pulled by the CVE.
Cisos can’t just change food and wait for the same coverage. Reconstructing this visibility requires money, time and resources that do not have many organizations.
Create internal possibilities: not realistic for most groups
Investment in internal scanners or training groups to do vulnerability research sounds empowering, but ignores the scale of the problem. Large businesses can afford a red team that focuses on the discovery and exploitation of weaknesses in systems, people and processes of an organization before the actual attacker. Most middle or smaller organizations? Not so much.
The vulnerability management teams are already running Lean. Asking them to reproduce what Miter has done with a fraction of the budget is unrealistic. No number of certifications or laboratories can replace a central, reliable source of vulnerability and metadata.
Collaboration: Useful but not silver sphere
Industrial groups such as ISAC (Center for Exchange and Information Analysis) can complete knowledge, but do not offer complete coverage. Sharing of peerings is inconsistent and informal. Cooperation helps to fill the gaps – it does not replace monitoring structured vulnerability on a scale. And let’s not pretend that the average engineer Ciso or vulnerability has time to analyze manual alerts from peer above anything else.
Budget redistribution is an exchange
Redistribution of resources means cutting from somewhere else in the group. Subscriptions to new information platforms and lease analysts are not just budget duties because they divert funds from the response of the incidents or protecting the end point, which will weaken the overall security attitude. It is a danger of reconstructing dollars and hope for the best.
Monitoring and arrangement: Yes, but with what reference?
If we have a steady base line, monitoring the effectiveness of new tools and power supply makes sense. However, with the CVE CVE potentially unstable, what does the security engineer compare? Measurements lose meaning without a common framework such as the CVE to align the definitions and scope.
The control of reality
The end of Miter’s CVE program is not a crisis, but it is also not an opportunity. CVE has never been a risk assessment tool. It’s a list. Carter Groome, Managing Director of First Health Advisory, said: “CVE dependence cannot be overestimated and as the old proverb says, you can manage what you do not count.”
CIO and CISO need realism, not idealism. Rapid turns and pious strategies will not cut it. We need prolonged investments in fundamental infrastructure, such as the CVE and a long -term review of the definition and communication of vulnerability data throughout the ecosystem.
