The renewed attention to the world’s largest island reflects the view that the world is merging into three spheres of influence, centered on the United States, Russia and China. While some dismiss this geopolitical vision as Trumpian vulgarity, the troubling reality is that it is neither unique to Trump nor completely absurd.
As the post-Cold War era recedes, a more regional and competitive order is reasserting itself. Great powers shape their immediate environment not only out of ambition but also because they face constraints. The farther one’s external influence extends, the more geography, domestic capability, or resistance from adversaries matter. Russia, China, and the US are each nuclear superpowers and the largest countries in their neighborhood, but each is also constrained by many factors beyond its government’s control.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin has reasserted influence over its neighbors through territorial control, hybrid and frozen conflicts, and economic leverage. For example, Belarus has long been tied to Russia through energy dependence and security integration, so much so that it has effectively lost its sovereignty without being formally annexed. Russia has also supported separatist enclaves in Moldova and Georgia, helped prop up authoritarian governments in Africa, seized Crimea in 2014 and launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine eight years later. But these efforts have come at an extraordinary cost, and a decisive victory remains elusive. That may offer little comfort to Russia’s smaller neighbors in Eastern Europe, but it suggests that the Kremlin’s sphere of influence has clear and finite boundaries.
China, which has the world’s second-largest economy, relies more on economic levers than military ones, and its reach appears to be more global than Russia’s. It has leveraged trade and investment ties for geopolitical gain. For example, Cambodia, which is heavily dependent on Chinese aid and investment, repeatedly blocked the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) from criticizing Chinese maneuvers in the South China Sea in 2012 and 2016. Likewise, after Chinese state-owned COSCO acquired a majority stake in the port of Piraeus, which criticizes Greece. Human Rights Council.
But even China’s influence has limits. The Belt and Road Initiative to finance infrastructure projects across its borders has often caused debt problems and provoked political resistance. In addition, China faces many challenges at home, including slowing growth, demographic decline, and structural economic and financial weaknesses. Like Russia, its ability to project power beyond its immediate neighborhood is limited.
The Trump administration’s recent assertiveness in America has been widely portrayed as a disruptive break from previous US foreign policy. But, in fact, it reflects structural motivations as much as Trump’s temperament. More conventional presidents, using softer language and more disciplined diplomacy, pursued similar ends and faced similar constraints.
Consider, for example, that the US Border Patrol had about seven million immigration encounters (when someone is stopped or deported at the border) during 2021–24, and that about 86 percent of the heroin and 93 percent of the cocaine consumed in the US comes from Mexico. In an ideal world, the US would pursue domestic measures to reduce American drug consumption and demand and curb immigration, making countries of origin safer and more prosperous. But that hasn’t happened. Overall, illicit drug use remains widespread, and even good faith efforts to promote sustainable economic growth and strong institutional reforms may take generations to bear fruit.
The US (under Democratic and Republican presidents) has instead sought to curb unwanted flows of people and goods by pressuring its neighbors – especially Mexico. President Barack Obama has done so through quiet diplomacy and institutional cooperation, framing enforcement in terms of partnership while expanding border control behind the scenes. Instead, Trump relies on public confrontation and coercion, using tariffs and other threats to force swift compliance and deter would-be immigrants. Despite these differences in style, the basic goal of shaping neighboring policies to serve US interests remains constant.
This brings us back to Greenland. While the outrage over Trump’s threats is understandable, the shock is somewhat naive. This is hardly the first time the US has openly shown interest in Greenland or that it wants more freedom to act unilaterally in the Arctic. It explored options to buy the area in the 19th century, occupied it during World War II, offered to buy it outright in 1946, and refused to give up its military presence thereafter.
The US has also pushed against restrictions imposed by the 1951 US-Denmark Agreement for the Defense of Greenland, such as through unilateral initiatives such as Project Iceworm, a plan to develop nuclear missiles under the ice sheet. Similarly, the US has treated the Northwest Passage as an international strait and caused diplomatic crises with Canada, which claims the passage as part of its internal waters.
US tensions with its Arctic allies have eased since the Cold War. But as melting ice opens up Arctic sea lanes and intensifies a renewed geopolitical power struggle in the region, Greenland’s strategic value has increased, making the resurgence of friction not surprising. Russia is already entrenched in the Arctic, and China is laying the groundwork through dual-use scientific research, icebreakers, Arctic-capable technologies, and cooperation with Russia.
Trump’s theatrics are controversial, but the drive behind them is familiar: securing US presence and unilateral decision-making capabilities, denying adversaries access, and controlling strategic points on the map. Another president might rely on quieter diplomacy and better alliance management, but the goal of maximizing operational autonomy to protect American strategic interests would likely be the same.
Geography, security and economics may be reshaping the world into three rival spheres of influence. But recent events show that power has limits. Russia’s expansion was disastrously expensive. China is constrained by the growth of domestic executives. And a U.S. turn toward America—for all the fuss—may betray a recognition that primacy is unsustainable without allies.
Fixating on Trump misses the bigger picture. Structural forces, more than personalities, drive geopolitical change. Recognizing this is essential to finding room for compromise and renewing the alliances needed to maintain political and economic stability.
