As geopolitical tensions rise, competition for the cutting-edge science and talent that underpins advanced technology has increased. The United States, China and other major powers now view leadership in areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors, quantum technologies and biotechnology as central to military capability, economic security and ideological influence.
No wonder, then, that governments are pouring money into strategic technologies, tightening export controls and investment controls, and subjecting international scientific cooperation to new security requirements. Research institutions are increasingly viewed as frontline national security assets. The logic of great power competition reshapes, and often constrains, cross-border academic relations and the mobility of scientists.
Some have called the current technology race the new “Cold war,” drawing parallels to the Cold War-era space race between the US and the Soviet Union, which began when the latter launched Sputnik in 1957. While there are indeed parallels, the irony is that the US is not following its successful Cold War strategy – China is.
To be sure, the US used export controls and alliance coordination during the Cold War to keep advanced weapons, nuclear materials, and dual-use technologies out of the Soviet bloc. But her general approach to science from the 1960s to the 1980s was forward-looking and proactive, rather than defensive.
The US government invested heavily in basic scientific research, which they believed was the key to overcoming the Soviet Union in the long run. This meant massively expanding support for university research through agencies such as the National Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health, creating new national laboratories, and establishing the Advanced Research Projects Agency (later renamed the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) to support high-risk, high-reward projects in computing, materials science, and communications.
While the space race strained funding for physics, engineering, and mathematics, programs like the GI Bill (enacted during World War II to pay tuition for US veterans) and increased federal student aid greatly boosted the supply of scientists and engineers.
The US also actively sought foreign talent during the Cold War. It combined generous research opportunities with relatively open—and often strategically targeted—immigration policies. America’s well-funded universities, national laboratories, and government agencies attracted scientists from around the world. Some, such as those willing to leave communist regimes in Eastern Europe, were deliberately recruited and sometimes given expedited security clearances. Over time, student visas, Fulbright scholarships, and immigration preferences for highly skilled professionals broadened and routinized the influx.
The message was clear: if you were a talented scientist, the best place to build your career and raise your family was in the US, but that is no longer a given. The proactive Cold War strategy of increasing support for science and welcoming foreign talent contrasts sharply with the Trump administration’s efforts to cut federal spending and isolate the US from the global research community.
The second Trump administration’s move to cut state research grants accelerates a slowdown in federal funding for basic science which began in the 1980s. Total investment in research and development since the end of the Cold War has increasingly been financed by profit-seeking corporations. At the same time, recent Visa repressions and anti-immigrant rhetoric have made the US feel less welcoming to many international students and of foreign origin professionals, who account about one fifth of the nation’s STEM (science, technology, engineering and mathematics) workforce and more than 40 percent of PhD-level scientists and engineers. Declining investment in basic science and discouraging foreign talent risks eroding the foundations of US scientific leadership.
Meanwhile, China is increasingly following a playbook similar to that used by America in the Cold War. Yes, the Chinese government has restricted the outflow of critical technology and data. But it has also significantly increased investment in basic science and implemented a series of measures to attract foreign researchers and talent from China abroad in key areas such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors and biotechnology. More specifically, China recently introduced a new visa K aimed at young STEM and technology workers who want to study or do business in the country, promoting it as roughly equivalent to the H-1B visa in the US
China’s boldness stands in stark contrast to America’s insecurity. Over the past decade, US policy has largely focused on defending the country against China, Russia and other adversaries through economic sanctions, export controls and tighter immigration restrictions. But a far more effective long-term strategy would be to expand investment in scientific research, welcome foreign STEM talent, and strengthen efforts to retain them.
This approach is correct under any circumstances. If fears of a second Cold War prove accurate, then America’s best chance for success is to return to the strategy that helped it win the first: pushing scientific frontiers domestically. And if those fears turn out to be overblown, investments in basic research—especially in universities and nonprofits—will continue to yield technologies that benefit everyone. The first Cold War made the case convincingly. Transformative breakthroughs such as the internet, personal computers, modern climate and weather monitoring systems, magnetic resonance imaging machines, and radiation-based cancer treatments were all products of continued scientific investment.
The effort to wall off the US is ultimately self-defeating when America’s competitors actively recruit the world’s brightest minds. The US can still lead the way in science, but only if it remains an open global hub, rather than retreating into a moated fortress.
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This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate.
